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PROSPECTUS FOR THE FURTHER STUDY OF
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By A. H. FELLERt
TiE sYsTEm of administrative adjudication has been with us a long
time. We can leave aside the Statute of Sewers enacted unaer Henry
VIII' and other ancient examples2 and merely point out that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission is more than fifty years old,a the Federal
Trade Commission more than twenty,4 and that many of the quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative functions of federal officials reach bac: for
many decades.' With all this history behind us, the legal profession still
lacks the knowledge on which any true understanding can be based. Doubt-
less there are few lawyers who are not now convinced of the necessity of
the system. Yet a large portion of the bench and bar continues to display
an attitude of suspicion, if not of hostility. A small group of devoted
scholars of administrative law have divided their attention between vit-
ing apologies for the system and studying in elaborate detail the relations
between administrative tribunals and the common-law courts. The neces-
sity of these tasks and the great value of the work of these men cannot
be overestimated. Yet, in the struggle to justify the system as a whole,
its actual workings have, with a few exceptions,G not been explored.
Between violent denunciations and eloquent defense of general principles
the gathering of detailed knowledge and the improvement of efficiency
languish. Legislative draftsmen continue to copy slavishly the procedural
provisions of old statutes, since they have no means of determining how
those provisions can be improved. The courts, often knowing but little
of the administrative process, are prone either to abdicate their legitimate
tVisiting Lecturer, Harvard Law School
1. 23 HaN. VIII, c. 5 (1531).
2. See REPORT OF T3E Comm rrmr ox MmisTErs' Povims (1932 Cmd. 4060) 8
et seq.; RoBsoN, JusTicE Am A u mlTsATEv LAW (1928) c. 1.
3. The Interstate Commerce Commission was established by the Act of February
4, 1887, 24 STAT. 379, 49 U.S.C.A. §11 (1934).
4. The Federal Trade Commission was established by the Act of September 26,
1914, 38 STAT. 717, 15 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1934).
5. Some of these functions date back to the beginning of our history. One of the
earliest federal statutes authorized the collectors of customs to allow dravwbacks of
duties on presentation of proper proof. Act of July 31, 1789, 1 STAT. 29, § 32.
6. At the head of this category must be placed Hmason, Tna FEmA TRADE
CommissIoN (1924) and SEAPFUAx, TE INTMSTATa COMMRCE COUnSSxo (1931-
38). See also McFALAxD, THE IxTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMUsIoN AND THE FEDERAL
TAD CoUmmssioN (1933); SiEPENs, ADmiNisAT V E TuuAx.s Aim Tm RuLES
OF EVIDExcE (1933); BLACHLY mN OATnAw, ADumiS1ATivz LmcstAo=N AmD AD-
junicATioN (1934) ; Nagel, Federal Departmental Practkce, THE Gnovrm or A. unc.u{
ADmixisTRATE LAwv (1923) 175.
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functions of control and to rubber-stamp administrative action, or, where
their emotions are aroused, to strike out blindly without regard for the
damage which may ensue.
If proof be needed of the dangers of this situation, two recent instances
will be found sufficient, the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission," and the proposal of a
committee of the American Bar Association to establish a United States
Administrative Court.8 In the Jones case the Supreme Court adopted an
emotional approach to a technical problem of procedure and, in its anxiety
to save a single securities issuer from the supposedly arbitrary actions of
a Commission, delivered an opinion the consequences of which may sweep
away the safeguards carefully designed by Congress to protect securities
issuers as a whole from precisely the arbitrary action which the Court
professed to fear.' The proposal for an administrative court exhibits the
same sort of distrust of, as well as failure to understand, the adminis-
trative process.'" Yet this suggestion to superimpose a gargantuan court
7. 298 U. S. 1 (1936).
-8. The proposal was embodied in the Logan Bill, S. 3787, 74th Cong. 2nd Sess.
(1936). The plan contemplated an Administrative Court to consist of a Chief Justice
and forty associate justices appointed for life. The Court of Claims, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court, and the Board of Tax Appeals were
to be abolished and all their members transferred to the new court as associate justices.
The court was to consist of a trial division and of an appellate division. Three stages
of procedure were provided for: The trial division was to try the facts in any pro-
ceeding. Appeal might then be had to the appellate division, which was to have jurisdiction
to review all matters appearing on the record, including both questions of law and of fact,
and which in its discretion might also permit or direct the taking of additional evidence,
In other words, the appellate division might in all cases grant a trial de novo, A
further appeal was provided from the decision of the appellate division to the appellate
division sitting en banc, its jurisdiction being limited to questions of law. Final review
would be the Supreme Court on certiorari.
The jurisdiction of the court was to include: (1) The jurisdiction now vested in
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, and
the Board of Tax Appeals, (2) the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts
over actions against Collectors of Internal Revenue for the recovery of taxes and over
suits to enjoin the collection of taxes, (3) the jurisdiction of the District Court of the
District of Columbia in proceedings of extraordinary processes against officers and
employees of the United States, (4) jurisdiction to review the action of any govern-
mental agency in refusing to admit any person to practice before it or on disbarment
from practice, and (5) the extensive jurisdiction now vested in any governmental
agencies over the revocation of licenses, permits, registrations or other grants for
regulatory purposes.
9. See the further discussion of this case, p. 670, infra.
10. The administrative court proposal has called forth a good deal of discussion.
See McGuire, Sailing Close to the Wind, or the Need for a Federal Administrative
Court (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 853; Cooper, The Proposed United States Admizistrative
Court (1936) 35 MIcH. L. REv. 193, 565; Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court
(1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 966. The Committee which proposed this plan has since
[Vol. 47: 647
19381 FURTHER STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 649
of vague contours and of no demonstrable utility on top of the existing
congeries of agencies was devised by a group of experienced and sophis-
ticated practitioners before administrative tribunals.
The task of the students of administrative law must be to learn what
the existing administrative tribunals are doing, what their remediable
defects are, what should be preserved and what discarded. This cannot
be done merely by scanning statutes and cases in the lav reports. It
cannot be done by proceeding on a priori assumptions as to what the
proper thing is. It cannot be done by appointing a committee, however
learned and eminent, which will look the field over for a month or two
and then render a report. It can only be done by the assiduous applica-
tion of scholars who have the time and energy to plunge into masses of
files, to talk to scores of men engaged in administration, and to think
out their conclusions on the basis of adequate information. Of course,
there is nothing new about this approach. The Commonwealth. Fund
recognized the problem as long ago as 1920 when Gerald Henderson
was commissioned to write his The Federal Trade Commission. Students
of administrative law know this book to be a landmark; yet more than
fifteen years have passed and only a few comparable works have been
produced. In the intervening years the administrative machine has be-
come more and more complex and the problems more and more pressing.
A revivification and intensification of these earlier efforts are earnestly
needed.
It is my purpose here to set forth a few of the problems to which
the further study of administrative law must be directed and to offer
a few suggestions of an experimental nature for furthering the progress
of this study. None of the problems propounded are answered here.
Many of them cannot be satisfactorily answered in the present state of
our knowledge. But they constitute the critical points of administrative
law today, and they must be answered in the near future.
ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS
The problem which precedes all others is what form the agency en-
gaged in administrative adjudication and legislation should take. We are
here concerned with those activities of administrative agencies which
have to do (a) with the promulgation of regulations goverrilag certain
conduct of groups of private persons, these regulations having the force
of law," and (b) with adjudications of the rights of private persons.
abandoned it. See its report in ADvAxcE PnOGRM OF THE Orn A.,.NUAL MIEErING OF
THE AIERICAN BAR AssocrATIoN (1937) at 183-186.
11. These regulations constitute what has been called "delegated legislation"
[REPORT OF THE Co0rITEr" oN MINIsTERs' PowERs, op. cit. mspra note 2, at 15] and
are to be distinguished from regulations dealing with internal management of an agency,
e.g., regulations on the preparation of correspondence, conduct of employees, etc. Here-
after the term "regulations" will be used only in the first sense.
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The first activity, often known as quasi-legislative, we will call "legis-
lative ;" the second activity, often known as judicial and quasi-judicial,12
we will call "adjudicative."'1
3
Several writers have recently attempted classification of the existing
types of these activities in the Federal Government.'" Whether such
classifications have any validity is a matter on which we may have con-
siderable doubt. Still, for purposes of exposition, it may be useful to
go over this ground again.
1. Legislative powers of executive departments. Nearly every execu-
tive department has power to issue regulations. Some of the more
striking examples are the tax regulations issued by the Treasury," the
"orders" regulating the handling of agricultural commodities issued by
the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act,"0
and regulations issued by the Secretary 'of Commerce under the Air
Commerce Act.' 7 The President is also entrusted with numerous powers
to issue regulations. 18
2. Legislative powers of independent agencies. Two types of inde-
pendent agencies have legislative powers: one type is the purely regu-
latory agency, typified by the Securities and Exchange Commission;"9
12. On the distinction between "judicial" and "quasi-judicial" see id., at 73-75.
13. Like most distinctions, this one is to a large extent artificial. It is easy to
call to mind many cases which may fall into either category in accordance with individual
points of view. From the standpoint of the courts, however, the distinction, whatever
the precise line of demarcation between the two categories, is important. For some
illustrations, see Comment (1936) 34 MrcH. L. REV. 672.
14. See BLACHLY AND OATMAN, Op. cit. supra note 6, at c. 7; Report of the Special
Committee on Administrative Law (1934) 59 A. B. A. REP. 539, 556 et seq.; list pre-
sented by Senator Byrnes, 82 CONG. R-c. 53 (1937).
15. REv. STAT. §321 (1875), and amendatory statutes, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1691 (1934).
16. Act of August 24, 1935, 49 STAT. 750, 7 U. S. C. A. § 601 et seq. (1934), as
amended by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, PuB. L. No. 137, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (June 3, 1937).
17. Act of May 20, 1926, 44 STAT. 568, 49 U. S. C. A. § 171 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
18. A few examples: the President is authorized to issue regulations under the
Connally Act which prohibits the transportation of "contraband oil" (oil produced in
excess of quotas allowed by state laws), Act of February 22, 1935, 49 STAT. 30, 15
U. S. C. A. § 715 (Supp. 1937); he may proclaim changes in rates of duty under the
Flexible Tariff Act, Act of June 17, 1930, 46 STAT. 696, 19 U. S. C. A. § 1330 et seq.
(1934) ; he may prescribe "such regulations as he may think fit" for carrying into effect
acts relating to Indian affairs, Rav. STAT. § 465 (1834), 25 U. S. C. A. § 9 (1934);
he may prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of the Neutrality
Act, Public Resolution No. 27, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936). See HART, Ta On-
DINANCE MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT (1925).
19. Created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 78a et seq. (1934). Other regulatory commissions are: the Interstate Commerce
Commission, note 3, supra; the Federal Trade Commission, note 4, supra; the Federal
Communications Commission created by the Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT.
[Vol. 47: 647
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the other is the agency which is mainly administrative, but which has
certain legislative powers, typified by the Social Security Board-
3. Adjudicative powers of executive departments. The adjudicative
power is a frequent concomitant of the legislative power, particularly
when the latter includes the power to issue permits or licenses. The
officer having power to issue the license is also given power to revoke
it. A typical example is the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to
issue and revoke licenses to classify, grade, or weigh agricultural pro-
ducts.' Another typical adjudicative power is that of the Secretary of
Labor with respect to the deportation of aliens.22
4. Adjudicative powers of independent agencies. Three types may
be distinguished here: (a) the administrative agency with adjudicative
powers, e.g., the Veterans' Administration ;2 (b) the regulatory agency
with adjudicative powers, e.g., the Federal Communications Commis-
sion; 4 and (c) the purely adjudicative agency, e.g., the National Labor
Relations Board.25
5. Administratve courts. These are purely adjudicative agencies with
jurisdiction to review the actions of other administrative agencies. The
1064, 47 U. S. C. A. § 1064 et seq. (Supp. 1937); the National Bituminous Coal Com-
mission, created by the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 48, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (April 26, 1937); the Federal Power Commission, created by the Act of
June 23, 1930, 46 STAT. 797, 16 U. S. C. A. § 791 et seq. (1934) ; the Federal Alcohol
Adftinistration created by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 STA.T. 977 (1935),
27 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
20. Created by the Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §301
et seq. (Supp. 1937). Other independent agencies having legislative powers are: the
Veterans' Administration created by the Act of July 3, 1930, 46 STAT. 1016, 38 U.S.
C. A. § 11 (1934), and Executive Order No. 5398 of July 21, 1930; the Farm Credit
Administration creited by Executive Order No. 6034 of March 27, 1933, conirmed by
the Act of May 12, 1933, 48 STAT. 51, 12 U. S. C. A. § 636 et scq. (1934) ; the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board created by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 47 STAT. 725
(1932), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1421 et seq. (1934) ; the Federal Reserve Board created by the
Act of December 23, 1913, 38 STAT. 251, 12 U. S. C. A. § 221 ct seq. (1934); the
Federal Housing Administration created by the National Housing Act, 48 STAT. 1246
(1934), 12 U.S.C. A. § 1071 et seq. (1934); the General Accounting Office, created
by the Act of June 10, 1921, 42 STAT. 23, 31 U. S. C. A. § 41 et seq. (1934) ; the United
States Maritime Commission, created by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 STAT.
1985, 46 U. S. C. A. § 1101 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
21. 42 STAT. 1283 (1923) as amended by 46 STAT. 1464 (1931), 7 U. S. C. A. §§252,
253 (1934).
22. 39 STAT. 887 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 154 et seq. (1934).
23. See note 20, supra.
24. See note 19, supra.
25. Created by the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S.
C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
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group comprises the Board of Tax Appeals.2 0 the Customs Court,2 the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,' and the Court of Claims,
-
20
6. Anomalous agencies. A number of agencies cannot be fitted into
these patterns. The Tariff Commission is a fact-finding body with cer-
tain adjudicative functions.3" The Grain Futures Commission is an
adjudicative body consisting of three cabinet officers."' The District
Court of the District of Columbia has certain hdjudicative functions of
an administrative nature.3 2 Other examples can be found which cannot
be fitted into any definite pattern.33
The legislative development of powers as here classified has never been
marked by any consistent principle.34 If a newly created power bears a
26. Created by the Act of June 2, 1924, 43 STAT. 336, 26 U. S. C. A. § 600 ct seq.
(1934).
27. Created by § 518 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 STAT. 972, as the Board of
General Appraisers, now governed by § 518 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAT. 737, 19
U. S. C. A. § 1518 (1934).
28. Created by the Act of August 5, 1909, 36 STAT. 91, 105, 28 U. S. C. A. § 301
et seq. (1934).
29. Created by the Act of February 24, 1855, 10 STAT. 612, 28 U. S. C. A. § 241
et seq. (1934).
30. Created by § 330 et seq. of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAr. 696, 19 U. S. C. A.
§ 1330 et seq. (1934). The commission is authorized to investigate unfair practices in
import trade and to make findings for transmission to the President, who is authorized
to exclude from entry articles concerned in such unfair methods.
31. The administration of the Grain Futures Act, 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U. S.
C. A. § 1 et seq. (1934), is entrusted to the Secretary of Agriculture, but the Grain
Futures Commission, consisting of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Corn-
merce and tlhe Attorney General, is authorized to suspend or revoke the designation of
a board of trade as a "contract market." The first Federal Power Commission was
composed of the Secretaries of War, Interior and Agriculture. Professor Frankfurter
found this to be "one of the chief sources of the Commission's failure." THE PtULIC
AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930) at 119.
32. Thus, this court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of
Patents suspending or excluding patent attorneys or agents from practice. REV. STAT.
§487, as amended 42 STAT. 390 (1922), 35 U. S. C. A. § 11 (1934).
33. Note the National 'Munitions Control Board consisting of five cabinet officers
established under the Neutrality Act, Public Resolution No. 27, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1936). Under the Connally Act regulating the interstate transportation of oil, the
President is authorized to establish so-called "Tender Boards" which have power to
grant or withhold certificates for shipment. 49 STAT. 31 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 715(d)
(Supp. 1937). The General Accounting office has been considered by some to be pri-
marily adjudicative, by others to be suf generis. It would appear to be primarily an
administrative agency with certain legislative and adjudicative powers.
34. Professor Cushman in his Problem of the Independent Regudatory Com-
m issions [3 STuDIEs oN ADMINISTRATIVE 'MANAGEMENT IN THE GovER-,.NtPNT OV TIH,
UNITED STATES (1937) 10] gives the following reasons for the establishment of inde-
pendent regulatory agencies: (1) quasi-judicial functions may be handled more impar-
tially by an independent agency; (2) fear of political pressure in the executive depart-
ments; (3) experts may be more willing to work in an independent agency; (4)
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resemblance to some existing power, Congress is likely to confer it on
the agency already in existence; thus, the Secretary of Agriculture is
given power to regulate futures trading in butter, eggs, and potatoes"
because he already regulates futures trading in grain, and similarly the
Interstate Commerce Commission is given power to regulate motor trans-
portation. 6 But there is no definite rule. The Secretary of Commerce
was empowered to regulate air transportation,3 although the matter could
just as easily have been entrusted to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. The National Labor Relations Act created a new agency, although
very similar functions were already being exercised by the National
Mediation Board under the Railway Labor Act.38 Curiously enough, the
latter Board now has jurisdiction over labor relations in air transporta-
tion.3 -
Often a newly created power will resemble several different existing
powers. You might assign the power to regulate electric utility coxnpanies
either to the Federal Power Commission because electric power is in-
volved, or to the Securities and Exchange Commission because securities
are involved, or to the Federal Trade Commission because holding com-
panies are involved, or to the Federal Communications Commission be-
cause transmission of energy by wires is involved. Actually Congress
adopted a Solomonic course and divided the baby between the first two
agencies.
40
Sometimes Congress cannot quite make up its mind and puts an agency
in an anomalous position. The National Bituminous Coal Commission
is "in the Department of the Interior," although it is difficult to discover
a perceptible difference between such a status and one of complete
independence.4' The Federal Alcohol. Administration was first created
regional representation was desired in some agencies; (5) no existing agency performing
similar functions; (6) experimental character of some of the regulatory tasks; (7)
belief that rule-making functions ought to be performed by a group rather than a single
officer; (8) the prestige of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
35. Commodities Exchange Act, as amended June 15, 1936, 49 STAT. 1491, 7 U. S.
C. A. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
36. Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S. C.A. § 301 ct seq. (Supp.
1937).
37. Air Commerce Act. See note 17, supra.
38. Act of May 20, 1926, as amended, 44 STAT. 577, 45 U. S. C. A. § ISI et seq.
(Supp. 1937).
39. Act of April 10, 1936, 49 STAT. 1189, 45 U. S. C. A. § 181 et seq. (Supp. 1937).
40. Title I of the Act of August 26, 1935, 49 STAT. E03, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 et seq.
(Supp. 1937) is entitled Control of Public Utility Holding Conmtaies and is adminis-
tered by the Securities and Exchange Commission; Part II, 49 STAT. 847, 16 U. S.
C. A. § 824 et seq. (Supp. 1937) is entitled Regulalion of Electric Utility Companies
Engaged in Intcrstate Comnnwrce and is administered by the Federal Power Commission.
41. Professor Cushman, op. cit. supra note 34. at 7, states that this status means
that the budget of the Commission and its "gcneral servicing" are cleared through
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"as a division of the Treasury Department, ' 42 and was later made an in-
dependent establishment.43 The Shipping Board began as an independent
commission, 44 then became a bureau in the Department of Commerce,
45
and finally became independent again under the name of the Maritime
Commission." The newly created United States Housing Authority was
placed "in the Department of the Interior," largely because the present
Secretary of the Interior had served as Administrator of the Public Works
Administration and had, in his latter capacity, built up a staff of housing
experts.47
The most significant legislative motive for the choice of the repository
of a newly created power has been political. Agencies quickly develop
definite characteristics of personnel, procedure, and policy. Consequently,
it may make a good deal of difference whether you put control over foods
and drugs in the hands of the Federal Trade Commission or the Secre-
tary of Agriculture. If the Treasury or the Federal Reserve Board had
been given the powers now exercised by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the present emphasis would most probably have been laid
much more on control of the mechanism of credit rather than on protec-
tion of the investor. These political considerations will inevitably remain
in the forefront of legislative consideration. Existing agencies have con-
genital characteristics which the most heroic efforts cannot change. Newly
created agencies quickly develop their own, Nonetheless, other consider-
the Department of the Interior. He believes that because of this status this Com-
mission makes "an interesting contribution to the study of administration." However
that may be, there is some evidence that the status may be the result of accident.
The original Bituminous Coal Conservation Bill introduced in 1935 [S. 2481, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935)] contained one title providing for the regulation of coal prices and
labor relations and a second title providing for the creation of a bituminous coal reserve.
The latter title was to be administered by the Secretary of the Interior, and it may well
have been felt that more unified administration would be secured if the CommissiOn
which administered the first title were also connected with the Department of the
Interior. Title II was stricken out in committee, but the words "in the Department of
the Interior" were left in Title'I, and the bill was passed in this form. These words
were carried over into the new Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 after the invalidation of
the first Act, perhaps because it was felt that the prior situation of the Commission
should not be changed pending Congressional action on the President's message of
January 12, 1937, which recommended that all independent agencies be placed "in"
executive departments.
42. Act of August 29, 1935, 49 STAT. 977, 27 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq. (Supp.
1937). This agency is the successor of the Federal Alcohol Control Administration
created by Executive Order under the National Industrial Recovery Act.
43. Act of June 26, 1936, 49 STAT. 1964, 27 U.S. C. A. § 202(a) (Supp. 1937).
44. Act of September 7, 1916, 39 STAT. 729, 46 U. S. C. A. § 804 (1934).
45. By Executive Order No. 6166 of June 10, 1933.
46. Merchant Marine Act, 1936. See note 20, mipra.
47. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Sept. 1, 1937).
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ations, which must be taken into account, are susceptible of reduction to
intelligible principles. These; it seems to me, are the questions on which
we need some light:
1. Which functions are peculiarly adapted for exercise by an executive
department, by a regulatory commission, by an adjudicative commission,
or by an administrative court?"
2. Is it possible to make a reasonable distinction bztween legislative
and adjudicative functions? If so, to what extent should these functions
be segregated?" A number of writers have assumed that the two should
always be segregated. It may be doubted whether close examination would
justify this extreme position.50
3. To what extent may the adjudicative functions with respect to dif-
ferent subjects be consolidated in one agency? Would it be possible to
consolidate certain adjudicative functions of a similar character, e.g., the
power to revoke licenses and permits of whatever nature, or to consoli-
date all adjudicative functions with respect to certain types of subject,
e.g., with regard to unfair competition or securities issues?
The problem of the choice of agency raises the question of the extent
to which legislative and adjudicative agencies dhould be independent of
the executive. Many persons assume that only an independent agency like
the Interstate Commerce Commission can be trusted to be impartial. In-
vestigation will probably show that the adjudicative functions of the
executive departments have been as free from political interference as
those of the independent agencies."' A great deal has also been said of
48. I am not suggesting that any criteria can be e.olved which will automatically
tell us where to assign the various functions of administration. It must be recognized
that political reasons will always remain in the forefront. Cf. Hsrmnnn., PurLic ADAI-
ISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1936) 347. Reasonable criteria would, however,
help greatly in guiding political judgment.
49. See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Admiistrati'e Law (1934)
59 A. B. A. Rip. 539, 544-551. CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 34, at 23 at seq. suggests
that all regulatory agencies be divided into two sections, one "administrative' to be
incorporated- into an executive department, and the other "judicial" (handling both
judicial and quasi-judicial matters) to be "in" the department for purposes of "admin-
istrative housekeeping" but otherwise completely independent. BLACHLY AND OAIxA;,
op. cit. mspra note 6, at 261 et scq. would transfer adjudicative functions to a system of
administrative courts.
50. The Committee on Ministers' Powers, while recommending .. at "judicial"
functions should normally be entrusted to the ordinary courts of law, took the view
"that quasi-judicial decisions fall properly within the province of executive Ministers,
who are responsible for policy and should control, direct, and administer it, and that
such decisions should not ordinarily be assigned to any tribunal other than the Minister."
REPoRT, op. cit. mipra note 2, at 115.
51. It has, never been suggested that the rate orders issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act have been influenced by political
considerations, and those of his orders which have been considered on the merits by
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recent years with regard to the tenure of the members of independent
commissions."2 It has been suggested that they should be appointed either
for very long terms or for life, as are the Federal judges. Yet it must
not be forgotten that these commissions are policy forming bodies as well
as adjudicative bodies. Should they be as completely independent of the
executive as are the courts? Executive control is an unmitigated evil when
it reaches down to individual cases and warps thd judgment of the admin-
istrators; it may be beneficent, however, when it guides the general policy
along the lines indicated by the electorate and Congress. 4
Such problems are of too delicate a nature to be solved by easy catch
words. Facts are needed, a great many more facts than we now have.
A recent suggestion that the budgets of independent commissions be
handled by executive departments 55 has evoked a storm of protest against
this supposed executive domination. The protestants have failed to note
that the budgeting and general servicing of the Federal judiciary is handled
by the Department of Justice.56 Yet no one has intimated that this control
has resulted in executive domination of the courtsY Perhaps the situation
would be different with respect to administrative bodies. Many of us
feel that it would, but it is to be doubted whether any of us have sufficient
data to form a considered judgment on the issue.
the Supreme Court have been upheld in all respects. See St. Joseph Stock Yards v.
United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936) ; Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426 (1936).
52. This problem seemed important enough to the American Bar Association to
form the subject of the Ross Bequest Essay Contest for 1937, under the title, The Admin-
istration, of Justice as Affected by Insecurity of Tenure of Judicial and Administrative
Offlcers. Th" prize winning essay reached the conclusion that "all of the more important
federal administrative officers exercising judicial functions" should hold office during
good behavior. (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 930, at 936.
53. The Logan Bill for a United States' Administrative Court provided for life
tenure for the judges. See note 8, supra. For a trenchant criticism of permanency of
tenure, see FRIEDRICH & COLE, RESPONSIBLE BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF THE Swiss
CIVIL SEaVICE (1932) 16.
54. A discussion of this problem will be found in CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 34,
at 13-17. See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Lawo
Theory (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 538, 573 ff.
55. Id., at 23.
56. The Act of June 28, 1902, 32 STAT. 476, 31 U. S. C. A. § 663 (1934) provides:
"Money appropriated for supplies for the United States courts and judicial officers,
shall be expended in payment for such supplies only as shall be purchased, in the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General, for delivery at the Department of Justice for distri-
bution." The salaries of judges are paid through the Department of Justice and the
United States Marshals. Act of August 1, 1914, 38 STAT. 653, 28 U. S. C. A. § 505
(1934) ; Act of July 31, 1894, 28 STAT. 210, 5 U. S. C. A. § 321 (1934). The appropria-
tions for the judiciary are included annually in the appropriations for the Department
of Justice.
57. Judge Denman has recently criticized the present system because of its ineffi-
ciency. Hearings on Reorganioation of the Federal Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937) 481.
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After the choice of agency has been made, numerous organizational
problems remain. The existing agencies show wide diversity of organiza-
tion. Some agencies are completely centralized in Washington, as, e.g.,
the Communications Commission. Other agencies have established re-
gional offices which reproduce in miniature the central organization. Thus,
the National Labor Relations Board has a considerable number of such
regional offices, each headed by a Regional Director assisted by attorneys
and so-called field examiners. Other agencies operate through itinerant
trial examiners, who sit wherever it is found most convenient to hold the
hearing. The Federal Trade Commission follows this practice. The motor
carrier division of the Interstate Commerce Commission operates in part
through so-called joint boards composed of members designated by state
agencies assisted by a Commission examiner."'
In a collegial commission the question is always present whether the
commission should operate through individual members, through small
divisions, or en barc. The statutory provisions vary widely. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the Communications Commission are
authorized to act through divisions of not less than three members, or
through boards of employees, or through individual commissioners.10 The
action of a division cannot be reviewed, but the action of a board or in-
dividual commissioner is subject to review either by the Commission as
a whole or by a division. The Bituminous Coal Commission is authorized
to establish divisions, each of which may exercise all the powers of the
Commission, but a person in interest is entitled to secure a review by the
Commission as a whole of any finding made by a divisioncO The Board
of Tax Appeals is authorized to act through divisions of one or more
members. The "reports" of divisions may be reviewed by the Board at
the direction of the Chairman, but a taxpayer may not request such a
review as of right. 1 The statutes creating the Federal Trade Commission,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Alcohol Adminis-
tration and the National Labor Relations Board are silent on this point.
In the executive departments, the legislative or adjudicative functions
are ordinarily conferred on the head of the department, although occa-
sionally they may be expressly conferred on a subordinate officer, e.g.,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who is an officer of the Treasury
58. See Kauper, Utilication of State Commissioncr: in the Administatnon of the
Federal Motor Carrier Act (1935) 34 MicH. L. REv. 37.
59. § 17 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 385 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 17
(1934); Sec. 5 of the Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1068 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A.
§155 (1934).
60. § 2 of the Bituminous Coal Act, Pub. L. No. 48, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (April
26, 1937).
61. § 601 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 871, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 603, 617, 618
(1934).
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Department. The Morgan case, discussed hereafter,0 2 in which the Su-
preme Court held that the officer who makes an adjudicative decision must
personally consider evidence and argument, may lead to considerable
changes in the existing distribution of these functions within the executive
departments.
A number of the departments and agencies contain special review
boards; Very rarely are these provided by statute, e.g., the Processing Tax
Board bf Review, which reviews determinations of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue with respect to refunds of processing taxes.63 Other
such boards have been set up in the absence of statute and are purely
advisory, e.g., the Board of Review in the Department of Labor, which
reviews determinations of the Boards of Inquiry in the Immigration
Service.
64
The problems of internal organization, while of less significance from
the standpoint of general policy than problems of the choice of agency,
must stand in the forefront of any consideration of improvement of effi-
ciency. Generally speaking, such problems must be solved according to
the requirements of the specific agency. Unfortunately, the framework
of the organization is ordinarily established at the beginning of the
agency's life when no experience is available. Disinterested examination
after the agency has been in operation a number of years might well
result in the change of organization.
If a commission may divide itself into a number of divisions, it will
be able to work much faster. However, private persons are unwilling to
gamble on the capabilities of a particular member or division, and inevit-
ably the demand arises either for a Board of Review or for review en
banc. These reviewing boards have sprung up rather haphazardly. A
committee of the American Bar" Association has recently recommended
that all heads of departments be required to s~t up review boards to which
any person "aggrieved by a decision, act, or failure to act" by any officer
or employee of the department may resort.6" Would this extend to the
refusal of an officer of the Department of State to recommend to the
Secretary that a reciprocal trade agreement be negotiated. or to the rejec-
tion of a bid by a procurement officer? Would it not entail so much
expense and delay, so many possibilities of confusion that it would dis-
credit the whole idea of intra-departmental review? It would be of greatest
62. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936) ; see pp. 662-4, infra.
63. § 906 of the Revenue Act of 1936, 49 STAT. 1748, 7 U. S. C. A. § 648 (Supp.
1937).
64. Boards of special inquiry are authorized under § 17 of the Act of February 5,
1917, 39 STAT. 887, 8 U. S. C. A. § 153 (1934). For a discussion of the Board of
Review, see REP. No. 5, NATIONAL COMMISSION oN LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-
MENT, DEPORTATION LAWS (1931) 157 et seq.
65. See report cited note 10, supra, at 225-226.
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value to know to what extent review boards are necessary. I find it hard
to believe that every "decision, act or failure to act" should be subject
to this sort of review. Here, as in many other places, inquiry and experi-
ment should precede general innovation.
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Few fields of law offer so much opportunity for valuable research and
instructive suggestion as the field of administrative procedure. Two
factors have made this study more propitious now than ever before. In
the first place, the Federal Register now publishes the rules of procedure
of the various agencies. In the past these were, in many cases, practically
unavailable. In the second place, the Supreme Court has recently handed
down a number of decisions of primary importance on procedural ques-
tions, and the beginnings of a body of case law are now before us.
There are, of course, innumerable problems of procedure to which
attention can be directed. I shall attempt here to sketch out only the few
which to me seem most pressing. 60
Hearings-when Required. We can start with the administrative
hearing. When should it be required? It is fairly well settled that when
the exercise of an adjudicative fun-tion is in question, due process of
law requires a hearing, and one which is as extensive as may be required
by the issues to be adjudicated." The problem arises in connection with
legislative functions. The power to issue regulations is a legislative
power, and no one has ever supposed that an act of the legislature is
rendered ifivalid by failure to hold hearings. On the other hand, legis-
latures usually do hold hearings on important measures.
Until recent years, most administrative agencies issued regulations
without notice and hearing, and most agencies still continue to do so.P
However. the N.R.A., with its slogan of "partnership of government
and business," adopted the prac ice of holding hearings on the codes of
66. One of the important problem not dis:usscd is that of the organization and
procedure for issuing administrative rculations (with the exception of the question of
hearing). This omission is due to tie fact thal the problem has recently been given
exhaustive treatment under the auspice of the President's Committee on Administrative
.Management. Hart, op. cit. supra note 1, and Witte, The Preparaion of Proposcd
Legislative Measures by .Adminismft ie Dep.rtntsnt, 5 STi.ES On .
TRATIVE I'ANAGE.,ENT IN THE G -. xmrEXT OF HE U.NITED ST.%xrS (1937). See also
Coman, LEGISL.kTn'E FuVxcTros OF NATIONAL Apmms:rsmi~t ALTonin ~s (1927);
FAIRLxE. ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN Co.nncmo-0 WiTrn STATUTOY RULES AND
OPDERS IN GRAT BRITAI. (19,7); , o rE T OF TUE CoaMrrMr oN 'MIss mEns' Povns,
op. cit. supra note 2, at sec. If.
67. i:trstate Com. Conma. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.. 2.27 U. S. 83, 91 (1913);
Southtrn Ry. v. Virginia, 29) U. S. 190 (1933).
63. An outstanding exuption has been the Interstate C0mmerce Commission in
which leg'slative procedure is closely assimilated to adjudicative procedure.
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fair competition. The practice was extended to other agencies after the
Supreme Court's decision in the Panama Refining case,"9 which struck
terror into the hearts of many administrators. "When the Agricultural
Adjustment Act was amended in 1935, the Secretary of Agriculture was
required to give notice, hold hearings, and make findings as a prere-
quisite to the issuance of "orders" regulating the handling of commodi-
ties." The recent Bituminous Coal Act provides that "no rule or regu-
lation which has the force and effect of law, shall be made or prescribed
by the Commission, unless it has given reasonable public notice of a
hearing, and unless it has afforded to interested parties an opportunity
to be heard, and unless it has made findings of fact.""1
It is not easy to determine just what the nature of these hearings should
be. Regulations usually affect great numbers of persons, and if several
hundreds attend a hearing, it is apt to become rather unwieldy. Often,
it would be a physical impossibility to permit protestants to present evi-
dence with as great freedom as in a court. and if cross-examination is
to be freely allowed, the hearing might continue indefinitely. Under
these circumstances, the hearing xrust assume the characteristics of a
hearing before a legislative committee instead of one before a court.
What then is its utility? For one thing it may be a convenient way
of getting information; for another, it is useful to have objections to
proposed provisions thrashed out in public discussion. 2 But since the
hearing must be strictly controlled by the administrative officer in order
to make it at all practicable, it may not be a particularly useful check on
the reasonableness of administrative action. The most a statute can do
is to provide that the regulations must be supported by substantial evi-
dence. In practice this safeguard is rather illusory. The administrative
69. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S 388 (1935).
70. § 8(c) of the Agricultural Adjustment A(t as amended, Pub. L. No. 137, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (June 3, 1937); 7 U.S. C.A. §608(c) (Supp. 1937).
71. § 2(a) of the Bituminous Coal Act, supra note 60. There has been other recent
legislation in which similar provision has been made. § 5(f) of the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act, 49 STAT. 984 (1935), 27 U S. C. A. § 205 (Supp. 1937); § 4 of
the Trade Agreements Act, 48 STAT. 945 (1934), 19 U. S. C. A. § 1354 (1934). Courts
are sometimes exceedingly strict in their interpietation of such provisions. See, e.o.,
Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 412 (C. C. P, A. 1935).
. 72. "Formal hearings on proposed regulations have special advantages which closely
parallel those of congressional debates and committee hearings. They give publicity
to the rule-making process. They give those affected a chance to have their cay in a
public forum. They give administrators a means of see'ng that all parties -n-intere.zt are
heard, by giving as much time to consumer as to trade spokesmen, and by carrying the
hearings into different localities in order to give a break to the little fellow, They also
may secure facts and points of view not readily securet by any other means. They
build up a public record. They bring to public attentior the phenomenon of pressure
politics, and this may have some educational value for piblic opinion. In short, they
keep rule-making from being done in a corner." HART, Op. fit. supra note 18, at 30.
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agency is often able to put some evidence in the record as a justification,
and if cross-examination of the agency's witnesses is excluded, it may
be almost impossible to break down their evidence.
If we assume that such hearings do have utility, when should use
be made of them? A committee of the American Bar Association desires
a universal requirement.3 Others might say that if the Treasury were
to hold hearings on all of the manifold regulations which it issues, its
officers would probably have little time to do anything else. If tile require-
ment is not to be universal, what should be the line of demarcation be-
tween the regulations which require hearings and those which do not?
It might be possible to classify regulations on the basis of their substance
or on the basis of the conditions on which they are issued. Regulations
which supply the details of a course of conduct prescribed by the legis-
lature, e.g., the hours at which drawbridges should be opened and the
signals which should be given, or how many sheep may be permitted to
graze on government land, or how a particular deduction should be taken
by a taxpayer, apparently differ from those which crystallize into concrete
form a general legislative purpose, e.g., which fix the minimum price
for coal or milk, or fix transportation rates. Hearings might be required
for the latter group and not for the former. Some regulations must be
issued as a matter of course, e.g., tax regulations, while others lie largely
within the discretion of the agency, e.g., when a "milk order" should be
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. Perhaps we should require a
hearing for the latter kind in order to provide some check on the exercise
of discretion. But it is far easier to outline broad general differences
between different types of regulations than to determine whether a par-
ticular regulation is of one type or the other. It may well be that the
difficulties of classification are insuperable and that the only solution is
to make the holding of hearings discretionary with the agency.
73. See report cited note 10, supra at 224-225. The conittee recommends that
all agencies be required to issue regulations "to implement every statute affecting per-
sons or property, required to be administered or enforced by" such agency, these regula-
tions to be subject to review by the Court of Claims on petition to be filed in accordance
with rules of the Court. The advantages of implementing statutes by regulations are
great, but it is hard to see how agencies can be forced to issue them as a practical
matter. Those who dislike advisory opi nions in constitutional cases will find the review
procedure most unsatisfactory, particularly since it is not possible to provide for any
appeal to the judicial courts from suc h decisions of the Court of Claims. A step tovards
requiring implementation by regulations was taken in Heitmeyer v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission (App. D. C., D cc. 27, 1937). An order denying an application for
a radio station permit on the gro und of alleged lack of financial responsibility was set
aside. The court said: "We are referred to no rule or regulation of the Commission
suggesting such a rigid standard. On such an important question we think the public
is entitled to have the statute implemented by a regulation setting out clearly and
concisely just what the Commiss ion regards as a minimum standard of financial ability:'
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Hearings-What are the Requisites? A recent Supreme Court deci-
sion, dealing with the nature of an adjudicative hearing, has raised a
new crop of problems with respect to administrative procedure. Morgan
v. United States74 involved a proceeding to enjoin the enforcement of
an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates to be
charged by market agencies at the Kansas City Stock Yards. An elabor-
,ate hearing had been :.eld before an examiner of the Department of
Agriculture. Subsequently there was an oral argument on the evidence
held before the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, who was then the
Acting Secretary. The order v as then issued over the signature of the
Secretary of Agriculture himself. The plaintiffs alleged in their bill of
complaint that the Secretary had not l-ersonally heard or read any of the
evidence or oral arguments and had not read or considered any of the
briefs submitted. The lower court, on motion of the Government, struck
out these allegations. The Supreme Court held this to be error. It said
that although the Secretary could, so far as permitted by statute, dele-
gate the duty of taking down the evidence, or even the duty of making
a decision, he could not himself make a decision without personally con-
sidering and appraising the evidence. "The 'hearing' is the hearing of
evidence and argument. If the one who determines the facts which
underlie the order has not considered evidence or argument, it is manifest
that the hearing has not been given . . The one who decides must
hear." 7
This decision seems so eminently reasonable on its face that some
explanation, is needed before its revolutionary character can be appre-
ciated. The Secretary of Agriculture administers forty-two regulatory
statutes. In addition, he administers a host of non-regulatory statutes,
some of them, like the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act,
of high national importance. Finally, he is a major political officer and
takes part in the formulation of national policy as a member of the Cabi-
net. If he were to give to every order which he signs the consideration
which the Morgan case requires, he would probably have to devote all his
time to the conduct of matters which must be considered petty from a
national viewpoint.
What is to be done about this situationi? Should the function of making
orders be delegated to subordinate officials? There is considerable psy-
chological value in having the signature o f the Secretary himself on the
order. It would carry less weight if signed by an unknown subordinate.
There is also the danger of a relaxation of responsibility in case of a
complete delegation. Even if the Secretary does not give full considera-
tion to the evidence, he at least brings his attention to bear upon the
74. 298 U. S. 468 (1936).
75. Id., at 481.
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problem, and does review the order, however sketchily, before signing it.
Should we put all these functions of the Secretary of Agriculture and
of other executive officers "in commission?" This might preserve the
advantages which would be lost by delegation to subordinate officers, but
would we be willing to face a great increase in the number of independent
commissions? It is possible that the Morgan rule does not apply to pro-
cedure before a commission. The Supreme Court distinguished the
Arlidge case,76 in which the House of Lords laid down a diametrically
opposite rule, in part on the ground that it related "to a different sort of
administrative action." 7 7 The only ascertainable difference is that the
Arlidge case involved a proceeding before a board. Is there any reason
why a board or commission should be able to decide without considera-
tion of the evidence, if an executive officer may not?
Aside from the necessity for substantial reorganization of the pro-
cedure of many agencies which the Morgan case implies, there is also
suggested the possibility that administrative orders may be subject to
attack on the ground of insufficient consideration of the evidence by the
deciding officer. We may even witness the incredible spectacle of long
trials in which administrative officers are questioned at length on the
amount of time which they spent in reading the record and what their
mental attitudes were. This actually happened in the Morgan case. When
the case went back for trial to the lower court, the plaintiffs submitted
over a hundred interrogatories to the Secretary, and elaborate depositions
were taken. The Secretary was asked how much time he had devoted to
the tetimony of each witness and to each exhibit, what weight he had
accorded to such testimony, what pages of the briefs he had read, what
theories of rate making he had considered and rejected, etc.7" If this
sort of thing is to be permitted, administrative adjudication will become
an ineffectual farce.
Much of the difficulty created by this decision would be obviated by
limiting it in two respects. First, the rule might be applied only in a
situation like the lorgan case, i.e., where the person who issues the order
did not himself hear the oral argument. This would restrict greatly the
number of cases in which orders would be attacked on this ground.
76. Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A. C. 120, rcvg', King v. Local
Government Board [1914] 1 K. B. 160.
77. 298 U. S. at 482 (1936).
78. See Morgan v. United States, (U.S.Dist.Ct..W. D. Mo.) Equity No. 2328 (1937),
in which it was found on the basis of this testimony that the Secretary had complied
with his duty as to the consideration of evidence and argument. The court construed
the Supreme Court's decision as follows- 'The Supreme Court hs not said that it was
the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture to hear or read el tlc evidence and. in addition
thereto, to hear the oral arguments and to read and consider brief&. I the Supreme
Court had said that it would have meant that the 11a,.kers and Stcdcyards Act cannot
be administered."
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Second, the duty resting on the deciding officer might be satisfied, if he
had considered the argument only and had not personally perused the
evidence. No one has dared suggest that litigants may impeach the deci-
sion of judges of intermediate appellate courts on the ground that they
had not read the record made before a lower court. No lawyer is naive
enough to believe that judges actually read through the records in the
cases before them. Why must the Secretary of Agriculture be more dili-
gent than the judges?"'
Precisely what the Morgan case means to administrative procedure
must await a close examination of existing practice in all the agencies."
It cannot be doubted that considerable changes will have to be made if
the decision continues to stand. What these changes should be and how
they can best be made consistent with the necessities of efficiency and the
utterances of the Supreme Court can only be answered after intensive
study.
Hearings-Who may participate? Administrative adjudications often
impinge on interests lying beyond the range of the specific proceeding.
When the Secretary of the Interior grants a grazing permit to one
grazer, other grazers may be affected. When the Federal Trade Com-
mission charges that a manufacturer is giving discriminatory discounts
to certain wholesalers in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, the
wholesalers are intensely interested in the proceeding, and the customers
of these wholesalers are almost as much concerned. The extent to which
such indirectly affected interests should be allowed to participate in ad-
ministrative proceedings is still undetermined. Most agencies provide in
their rules of procedure for intervention by "interested parties." The
phrase is so vague that no person can tell in advance whether or not he
comes within its description. Administrators profess to fear the possi-
bility of having proceedings overwhelmed by intervenors and tend to cut
down the scope of "interest" whenever possible. Thus, the Federal Com-
munications Commission, while providing in its rules for intervention by
any person having a "substantial interest," refuses to permit one radio
79. "Let it be frankly stated now that the judges of this court, whose duty it was
to consider the case de novo (since it involved constitutional issues), did not read all
this testimony. We think, moreover, that it may be predicted with some assurance that
all this testimony will not be read by the justices of the Supreme Court, when, as they
must, they consider the cases on the merits." Ibid.
80. The Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes the Tariff Commission to investigate charges
of unfair practices in import trade and to make findings for transmission to the Presi-
dent. The latter is authorized to exclude from entry articles concerned in such unfair
practices. 46 STAT. 704, 19 U. S. C. A. § 1338 (1934). Does the Morgan case mean
that such action by the President is invalid unless he personally considers the evidence
and argument on the basis of which the Commission made its findings? A possible
answer is that the President's act is executive in character and might have been author-
ized by Congress without the necessity of a hearing.
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station to participate in a proceeding brought by another station for modi-
fication of its license even though both stations are direct competitors in
the same area.
81
Even where the privilege of intervention is liberally allowed, it may
not be effective if interested persons are not given notice of the proceed-
ings. Yet, it would frequently impose an intolerable burden on an agency
to require it to determine all the persons who might have an interest and
to serve notice upon them. The National Railroad Adjustment Board has
experienced the difficulties of this problem. This agency has jurisdiction
over disputes between the carriers and their employees over the interpre-
tation of contracts.82 Ordinarily a dispute arises between the carrier and
a labor union representing the employees, and the Board has followed the
policy of giving notice only to the carrier and the union. But the effect
of an award against the carrier will be to deprive some employee or other
of the advantage accorded to him by the carrier. The courts have held
that such an aggrieved employee is entitled to notice and an opportunity
to defend his rights, although the dispute is strictly between the carrier
and the union as representative of the employees alleged to have been
discriminated against.
83
Such instances of judicial determination of the scope of an adminis-
trative hearing are rare. The problem has been handled by administrative
agencies in haphazard fashion, and no attempt has been made at the de-
velopment of consistent rules for intervention. Much could be accom-
plished by better definition of the term "interested parties," and this
requires a study of the extent to which particular administrative proceed-
ings affect outside persons.
Findings. When another person takes some action affecting our inter-
ests we naturally desire to know the reasons which motivated him Courts
have been accustomed to satisfying this desire by writing opinions setting
forth the grounds for their action. We all know that often they are
content to let curiosity go unsatisfied and to refrain from writing
opinions. The Supreme Court has never said that the Constitution
requires that opinions be written, and it disposes of hundreds of cases
every year with the simple phrase, "petition for writ of certiorari denied."
It is only in recent years that it has required the Federal district courts
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law."' While the Cr-stitution
is thus lenient with respect to the courts, it is much harder on adminis-
81. See Sykes v. Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. 15. C., 1935), cert. denied, 296
U. S. 624 (1935) ; (1936) 45 YAI.E L J. 934.
82. This Board is discussed by Garrison, The Naltional Railroacd Adjustment Board:
A Unique Administrative Agency (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 567.
83. Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Estes v. Union Terminal
Co., 89 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
84. By See. 70/ of the Federal Equity Rules.
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trative agencies. When the laiter act in an adjudicative capacity, they
must make findings or else their action becomes void. irrespective of
whether or not the statute requires the making of findings." Two reasons
are given for the rule. If an administrative officer could act without giv-
ing a reason, he might act for a reason outside his authority, and this
would amount to an unfettered delegation of power. Further, since his
action is subject to judicial review, the reviewing court would have no
basis for review unless it knew why he took the action. Neither reason
is particularly impressive. Whether or not an act is within the officer's
delegated powers can always be seen from the face of his act. Even if
he gives proper reasons for acting as he did, he may have had hidden
motives which no court can probe. It is undeniably helpful to the re-
viewing court to have the reasons set forth, but how can this be a con-
stitutional requirement when courts of first instance are free to act
without findings?
It would profit us little to try to find a rational constitutional basis
for the requirement. It should suffice that the practical basis is sound
enough. The requirement is an excellent one. The advantages of care-
fully drawn findings are immense. They induce a sense of responsibility
on the part of the administrative officer; their formulation aids im-
measurably in the formulation of the decision; they limit the issues to
be decided on review and save the time of litigants and the courts. All
these advantiges flow from findings carefully drawn; if they are merely
perfunctory they are completely useless. And it is in this category that
a great proportion of the findings currently made by administrative
agencies must be put. Almost fifteen years ago Henderson in his The
Federal Trade Commission wrote a brilliant exposition of the problem."0
It is sad to contemplate how little his analysis and recommendations have
affected current practise. The low water mark was reached in the NRA
where (after the Panama Refining case had indicated that findings were
necessary) every code began with a parroting of the preamble to the
statute without regard to whether the code dealt with coal or candlewick
bedspreads. I doubt whether any agency can now be found with so
little sense of discrimination, but too many are still content to para-
phrase the language of the statute rather than to give a clear account of
the facts which led to the particular decision. T here are. of course,
salient exceptions, among which the National Labor Relation5 Board is
particularly to be noticed.
85. Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 260 U. S. 49 (1922);
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 (1924). Cf. Heitmeyer v. Federal Communicatiotns
Commission, App. D. C., Dec. 27, 1937.
86. C. 3 (1924).
87. Note the graphic nature of the findings in the Jnes & Laughlin case v, hich are
summarized in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughl;n Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1 (1937).
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Here is a fertile field for scholars. Henderson has given the cue.
What we need now is a study of the practise of other agencies with
respect to findings of fact and detailed recommendations as to how it
should be improved.
If the Supreme Court had contented itself with laying down the re-
quirement for findings in adjudicative action, there would have been little
cause for complaint on the part of administrative officers. However, in
the last few years the Court has handed down a number of decisions with
regard to findings as a prerequisite to legislative action. It began with
the Panama Refining case. 8 Section 9c of the Recovery Act authorized
the President to prohibit the interstate transportation of oil produced
or withdrawn from storage in excess of amounts permitted by State
law. The statute required no findings, and the President made none.
The Court held the statute invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, and then held the President's order invalid because it
was made without findings. The authority given to the President was
purely legislative in nature. It was the same sort of power that had
been exercised by executive departments and independent agencies for
many decades. If findings were necessary here, were they not necessary
in all cases of legislative action? Did this mean that the immense mass
of regulations, those governing taxes, navigation, transportation, public
lands, all the myriad activities within Federal control, were invalid be-
cause they have been issued without findings?
The Court had not made matters any easier by handing down on the
same day an even more puzzling decision in United States v. Baltimore
and Ohio R.R.19 The Boiler Inspection Act empowers the Interstate
Commerce Commission to make regulations with respect to locomotives
and their appurtenances which cause "unnecessary peril to life and limb."
After an extensive hearing, the Commission had ordered the railroads
to equip all locomotives above a certain size with power-operated reverse
gears. The Court set the order aside because the Commission had failed
to make a specific finding as to whether "the use of any or all types of
steam locomotives 'equipped with hand reverse gear as compared with
power reverse gear causes unnecessary peril to life or limb.' ,c The
statute requires the Commission to make a report stating its "conclusions"
together with its "decision." The Commission had rendered an elaborate
report in which it had discussed the relative advantages and disadvantages
of the two types of gears. But this was held not to be enough. The Court
admitted that "formal and precise findings are not required" under the
88. 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
89. Id., at 454.
90. Id., at 464.
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Act,"' but held that this did not "remove the necessity of making, where
ordefs are subject to judicial review, quasi-jurisdictional findings essen-
tial to their constitutional or statutory validity." 2
The action of the Commission was of a legislative character." Does it
follow that wherever regulations are issued "quasi-jurisdictional" findings
must be made? It is said that the rule applies only "where orders are
subject to judicial review." This particular iegulation could under the
statute be directly attacked by a proceeding to review. Most regulations
can be attacked only collaterally in a proceeding either to enforce or to
penalize a violation. But they also are subject to judicial review in this
collateral proceeding. Certainly, no reasonable distinction can be made
between a regulation which may be reviewed directly and one which may
be reviewed only in a collateral proceeding. What precisely is the utility
of a "quasi-jurisdictional" finding? If a commission is authorized to
issue regulations "in the public interest," it would seem to be enough for
it to say, "We find that it is in the public interest to issue these regula-
tions." More cannot be required unless the Court is willing to force the
holding of hearings and the making up of voluminous records.
While these two cases are puzzling enough, a third case has added
further elements of confusion. In Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v.
White9 a regulation of a state department of agriculture was challenged
on the ground that no findings had been made. The Couit said:
"It is contended that the order is void because the administrative
body made no special findings of fact. But the statute did not require
special findings; doubtless because the regulation authorized was
general legislation, not an administrative order in the nature of a
judgment directed against an individual concern." 9 5
Does this decision overrule the Panama and Baltimore and Ohio cases?
Presumably they still stand, but in a twilight zone of doubt.
There are plenty of problems waiting for investigation and solution.
Should findings be required as prerequisites to regulations? Can a rea-
sonable classification be made between those which should be made on
findings and those which should not? Is there any utility in a "quasi-
jurisdictional" finding? If there is, which would be the most useful and
91. The original Interstate Commerce Act had required findings of fact, but the
requirement was stricken out by § 3 of the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 STAr. 589, 49 U. S.
C.A. § 14 (1934).
92. 293 U. S. at 465 (1935).
93. In form the proceeding was adjudicative, being directed against all the railroads
as named respondents and being subject to direct judicial review. In substance it was
clearly legislative, directing the railroads to install a specific type of apparatus on their
equipment.
94. 296 U. S. 176 (1935).
95. Id., at 186,
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practicable form? Where there is no hearing or record, should the find-
ings set forth facts based on information found in the files of the
agency?" If formal findings are not possible, would it be useful to
accompany regulations with an explanatory report giving the reasons
for their issuance?
Presentation of Issues. The opinion in the Morgan case,"7 heretofore
discussed, brought to the fore the important problem of the form in
which issues are to be presented for decision by the administrative officer
or commission. The plaintiffs alleged that at the conclusion of the taking
of testimony before an examiner a request was made that the examiner
prepare a tentative report, which should be subject to oral argument and
exceptions, but that the request was denied. The Supreme Court held
that the particular type of procedure suggested was not essential to the
validity of the hearing.
The procedure for which the plaintiffs had asked is the one followed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board; and a number of other
agencies."" The procedure is briefly as follows: After the conclusion of
the hearing the trial examiner prepares a report which contains his find-
ings of fact. Some agencies provide that he may in his discretion request
proposed findings of fact from the parties, but there is no argument on
these proposed findings before the trial examiner as is the case in trials
before a court. The examiner's report is served on the parties who are
then given an opportunity to file exceptions to the findings of the examiner
or his failure to make findings or to the admission or exclusion of evi-
dence. The parties are also permitted to file briefs in support of their
contentions. On request of any party, oral argument is then had before
the Commission, which subsequently issues an order containing its ovn
findings.
The advantages of this procedure are obvious. The time of the com-
mission is conserved since the issues are crystallized in the examiner's
report, and the attorneys are enabled to address themselves to the specific
points raised by the exceptions. The report apprises the parties of the
nature of the case which can be made out for or against them, and may
shape their arguments accordingly. The examiner's findings epitomize
the record, often voluminous and stuffed with extraneous material, and
96. In United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 265 U. S. 274 (1924), a finding
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, based on reports which vere found in its
files but were not introduced in evidence, was held void. Should not a different rule
apply in the case of legislative findings where no hearing is necessary?
97. See p. 662, supra.
98. Since the Morgan; case the Department of Agriculture has adopted this pro-
cedure for its practice under the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Toxins Act, and
the Federal Import Milk Act. 1 F. . (D. I.) 1577, 1578, 1579.
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reduce the evidence to manageable proportions. The disadvantage is that
the procedure frequently takes a good deal of time. Moreover, many
lawyers fail to take advantage of the opportunity to present exceptions to
the report, and much of the value of the procedure as a definition of the
issues is lost. This might perhaps be remedied by requiring the parties
to plead to the report and to assume that all findings not specifically
denied are to be taken as true.
The alternative procedure, under which the examiner's report, if any,
is not circulated among the parties, and no opportunity is given for excep-
tions, seems inferior; yet it is surprising that so many agencies still
continue to follow it. An investigation of the reasons why the apparently
preferable practise has not been universally adopted would be instructive;
it may be merely ignorance or inertia, or it may be that conditions peculiar
to some agencies make its adoption impracticable or inadvisable.
General procedural principles. It is doubtful whether the time has yet
come for the formulation of general procedural principles applicable in
all types of administrative tribunals. However, an interesting subject for
study is the extent to which the analogies of procedure in the judicial
courts may be resorted to for building up a body of administrative pro-
cedural rules. The dangers which lurk in uncritical assimilation are
revealed in Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission,0 where the
Court analogized a stop order proceeding under the Securities Aet of
1933 to a suit in equity. Because, in the latter case, the plaintiff possesses
the unqualified right to dismiss his bill unless some prejudice will result
to the defendant, it was held that a registrant may withdraw his regis-
tration statement at will. But since the commencement of an equity suit
puts the defendant on notice that he acts at his peril, even though no
temporary injunction is issued, it follows that the mere issuance by the
Commission of an order to show cause suspends the effectiveness of a
registration statement and places on the registrant the risk of being
held in violation of the law if he continues to sell securities before the
issuance of a stop order. This result seems to be contrary to the explicit
terms of the statute, and, if adhered to in the future, will substantially
diminish the procedural safeguards which Congress has set up for the
protection of issuers of securities against arbitrary Commission action.
Yet, despite the unfortunate consequences of procedural analogies in this
case, it cannot be doubted that such analogies have their place. When
properly applied with full knowledge of the consequences, they may con-
tribute greatly to the building up of administrative law.
Combination of judge and prosecutor. Much of the denunciation to
which administrative tribunals have been subjected has been directed
against the combination of prosecuting and adjudicative functions in the
99. 298 U. S. 1 (1936).
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same agency. Indeed, many sympathetic students have found this situa-
tion disturbing. It may be that these doubts are well founded, but wvhether
they are is now a matter of mere speculation. Has this combination im-
paired the judicial quality of administrative acts? Would efficiency suffer
if the two functions were separated? How expensive would the separa-
tion be? These questions must be answered before a definitive solution
can be found.
PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
Administrative tribunals exist for the purpose of speedy and informed
solution of controversies and enforcement of the laws. While the prin-
ciple of judicial review must be preserved, it is futile to place an admin-
istrative order in the category of mere advisory pronouncements. Ad-
ministrative tribunals are not just mechanical aids to the taking dovn of
evidence. If they were, we could spare a good deal of expense ly turning
their functions over to masters in chancery. The administrative order
must import a sanction even though the imposition of pains and penalties
be ultimately entrusted to the courts. The problems of enforcement of
administrative orders can best be approached by considering the follow-
ing categories:
1. Unenforceable orders. A number of administrative agencies have
in the past been authorized to issue orders which have no sanction behind
them except the force of publicity and public opinion. An outstanding
example is the old Railway Labor Board under the Transportation Act
of 1920.10 There are also a number of instances in which administrative
agencies issue orders which have no primary sanction, but which may
become factors in later proceedings leading to enforceable orders. Thus,
when the National Labor Relations Board certifies that certain persons
are the representatives of employees for collective bargaining purposes,
the certification, as such, carries no sanction.1"' However, if the em-
ployer refuses to deal with the certified representatives, a proceeding may
be instituted against him for engaging in an unfair labor practice.10 2
A peculiar type of administrative proceeding which does not result in
an enforceable order is provided by the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
The Secretary of Agriculture may conduct a hearing to determine whether
a handler of agricultural commodities is violating an order, the purpose
being to determine the facts so as to refer the matter to the Attorney
General for appropriate action. 03 The theory of such a proceeding is
100. See Pennsylvania R. R. v. United States Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72 (1923).
101. Sec. 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, cited mipi'a note 25.
102. Sec. 8(5) of the Act.
103. Sec. 8(a) (7), Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, 50 Sr&T. 246 (1937),
7 U.S.C.A. § 608(a) (Supp. 1937).
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that the offending party will mend his ways under threat of court pro-
ceedings. A similar system is followed under the Pure Food and Drugs
Act.1
04
2. Cease and desist orders. The cease and desist order has become
a standard type since .its adoption in the Federal Trade Commission
Act.'0 5 Its distinguishing feature, and a salient defect from the admin-
istrative tandpoint, is that a violation of the order carries no penalties
until the agency applies to a court for enforcement. If the court affirms
the order, a violation constitutes contempt of court. The private party
may also secure a review of the order by application to a court. The
delays of the law often mean that the order remains a brutum fidhnen
for many months. As a result, this type of order is most ineffective as
a protection to urgent public interests.
3. Orders the Violation of which is punishable by criminal penalties.
When the Interstate Commerce Commission issues an order, it need not
apply to a court for enforcement. The private party may secure a court
review by instituting a proceeding to set the order aside, but if he does
not, any violation of the order subjects him to a severe penalty.100 The
Securities Act adopts a similar system. If the Commission issues a stop
order, a further sale of securities is a criminal offense since it constitutes
a sale without having a registration statement in effect. 107
4. Licenses. A licensing system constitutes a most effective enforce-
ment method, for one can not do business until he secures a license.
This means that he must undergo administrative scrutiny before he
begins operation, and since revocation of the license means the loss of
a valuable privilege, violations are apt to be rare. The disadvantage
of a licensing system is that the withdrawal of the license may be too
drastic a sanction; a minor infraction may lead to the destruction of
a man's business. The system is best adapted to situations where the
government extends a privilege the withdrawal of which will not amount
to economic death. Thus, *the Bituminous Coal Commission is em-
powered to approve the formation of marketing agencies which are
exempt from the antitrust laws.'08 A withdrawal of the privilege will
not put any coal producer out of business; it will only deprive him of
the privilege of associating with other producers in the disposal of his
104. Sec. 4 of the Act of June 30, 1906, 34 STAT. 769, 21 U. S. C. A. § 11 (1934).
105. Sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S.
C. A. §45 (1934). The" same type of order is provided for in the National Labor
Relations Act and the Bituminous Coal Act.
106. Sec. 16 of te Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 384 (1887), 49 U. S. C.A.
§ 16 (1934). The Commission is also authorized to sue for an injunction to compel
enforcement.
107. Sec. 5 of the Securities Act, 48 STAT. 77 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77(e) (1934).
108. Sec. 12 of the Bituminous Coal Act, supra note 60.
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coal. At the same time the threat of withdrawal of approval is a far
more effective sanction than the threat of a suit to enjoin the disap-
proved practices.
An interesting application of the license system was found in the
original Agricultural Adjustment Act. The Secretary of Agriculture
issued blanket licenses to the handlers of agricultural commodities.1
This was a curious kind of license since the handler was not required to
make application for it. However, if he violated the regulations of the
Secretary, he could be deprived of the license and thus put out of business.
The system proved to be unsuccessful and was replaced by a system of
orders enforceable by injunction and criminal penalties.
5. Tax penalties. A unique system of sanctions is provided in the
Bituminous Coal Act. The statute levies a tax of 193/2% on the sale
price of coal. A producer who adheres to the "Bituminous Coal Code"
is exempt from the payment of the tax. If he violates the provisions
of the code, the Commission may revoke his membership in the code.
During the period when he is out of the code he must, of course, pay
the 193/% tax, and, if he applies for reinstatement, lie must pay, in
addition, double the amount of the tax on the coal sold in violation of
the code.11 Apparently the hope of those who devised this system was
that it would operate as an automatic penalty and one which was exactly
proportioned to the offense. It seems unduly cumbersome, and only time
can tell whether it will be effective.
The foregoing list of enforcement devices is not exhaustive, but it
will suffice to show the multifariousness of the problem. It will require
.intensive study to determine how all of these devices work out in practice
and how a more orderly system of enforcement can be devised.
A FEW SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The purpose of this discussion has been mainly to point out a number
of the directions for future investigation. Any informed reader will
immediately call other problems to mind. Those which are here men-
tioned seem to me the most pressing and the most likely to yield fruitful
results to the student. In a field of this kind, research can best be con-
ducted along institutional lines. The nature of the problems and of the
materials is such that uncoordinated efforts can bring forth only rela-
tively meager results. With some hesitation, I would suggest the fol-
lowing program.
Individual research along the lines begun by Henderson and Sharfman
should, of course, be continued intensively. Research of this type requires
fairly liberal subsidy, and it is to be hoped that the Commonwealth Fund
109. Sec. 8(3) of the Act of May 12, 1933, 48 STAT. 35.
110. Sec. 5 of the Bituminous Coal Act, supra note 60.
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will continue to finance projects of this kind. Such researches must,
however, be coordinated, the individual scholars brought together to
exchange ideas, and general principles discussed with informed members
of the profession. The coordination could be accomplished through the
American Law Institute. At the same time the Institute should consider
the support of research projects requiring the cooperative efforts of a
number of scholars. I certainly do not suggest any "reitatement" of
administrative law. But I would urge that a long range program for
the preparation of recommendations for improvements in administrative
organization and procedure be set afoot.
The practical application of the findings and recommendations of
scholars requires some sort of governmental action. It is a fine thing
to erect landmarks, but they fail of their purpose when navigators have
no eyes for them. It would not be advisable to draw up a comprehensive
code for passage by Congress. The preferable, and perhaps the only prac-
tical, course is to set up an agency charged with the duty of investigation
and experimentation. I would suggest for this purpose the creation of
a Conference of Senior Law Officers of the various agencies. Such a
body would be in an excellent position to secure an integrated view of
the system of administrative justice and should be able to make informed
recommendations for improvement in procedure. This body could be
entrusted with the duty of keeping in touch with the researches of
scholars. Its chief duty would be the preparation of rules of practice
for the various agencies; it could put into effect all sorts of minor im-
provements which are badly needed; it could undertake the publication
of a central collection of administrative decisions; it could adopt devices
for limiting the size of the voluminous appellate records which admin-
istrative proceedings now produce.
This body could go farther and experiment with clianges in organiza-
tion. For example, it could be authorized to arrange for an interchange
of trial examiners among the various agencies. If a body of roving
trial examiners could be gradually brought into being, two advantages
would result. The examiners would gain experience in the procedure of
various agencies and would act as critical and unifying agents. More
important, the loosening of the ties between the examiner and the par-
ticular agency which employs him would breed a greater spirit of im-
partiality and take some of the sting out of the complaint that admin-
istrative agencies confuse the functions of judge and prosecutor.
In short, the Coriference here suggested could undertake many of the
functions of a supreme administrative court without necessitating the
creation of a huge new machine and without impeding the operation of
a system which, whatever its faults, is the creature not of theory but of
experience and hence not lightly to be disturbed on the basis of untested
assumptions.
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